98 lines
3.0 KiB
C
98 lines
3.0 KiB
C
/* Copyright (c) 2005-2007 Apple Inc. All Rights Reserved. */
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/*
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* rsaPadding.h - PKCS1 and OAEP padding support.
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*
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* Created Aug. 10 2005 by Doug Mitchell.
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*/
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#ifndef _LIBGRSA_RSA_PADDING_H_
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#define _LIBGRSA_RSA_PADDING_H_
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#include <libgRSA/libgRSA.h>
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#include <libGiants/giantIntegers.h>
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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extern "C" {
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#endif
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/* PKCS1 padding markers */
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#define RSA_PKCS1_PAD_SIGN 0x01
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#define RSA_PKCS1_PAD_ENCRYPT 0x02
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/*
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* RP_None padding routines - just check length and convert between
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* byte array and giant
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*/
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RSAStatus rsaAddNoPadding(
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const unsigned char *plainText,
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gi_uint16 plainTextLen,
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giant result); /* RETURNED */
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RSAStatus rsaCheckNoPadding(
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giant decryptResult,
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unsigned char *plainText, /* data RETURNED here */
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gi_uint16 *plainTextLen); /* IN/OUT */
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/*
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* Specialized "no padding" check for signature verify operation.
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* We don't deserialize the decrypted giant; we do a byte-for-
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* byte compare of the expected decrypted value against memory
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* passed in to us, in-place in the decrypted giant.
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* This saves two stack-allocated byte arrays, each of
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* MAX_PRIME_SIZE_BYTES - one here, and one in RSA_SigVerify().
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*/
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RSAStatus rsaCheckNoPaddingForSigVfy(
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giant decryptResult,
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const unsigned char *expectPlainText,
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gi_uint16 expectPlainTextLen);
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RSAStatus rsaAddPkcs1Padding(
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const unsigned char *plainText,
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gi_uint16 plainTextLen,
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gi_uint16 totalLength, /* intended total length */
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unsigned char padMarker, /* RSA_PKCS1_PAD_{SIGN,ENCRYPT} */
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RSARngCallback *rngCallback, /* required for RP_PKCS1, RP_OAEP */
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giant result);
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/*
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* Given decrypted plaintext in the form of a giant, which should
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* be the same size as n, verify proper PKCS1 padding and copy
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* resulting plaintext and length into caller-supplied buffer.
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* On entry, *plainTextLen indicates the size of the available
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* plaintext buffer. On return, *plainTextLen indicates the
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* number of valid bytes of plaintext recovered.
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*/
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RSAStatus rsaCheckPkcs1Padding(
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giant decryptResult,
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unsigned char padMarker, /* RSA_PKCS1_PAD_{SIGN,ENCRYPT} */
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unsigned char *plainText, /* data RETURNED here */
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gi_uint16 *plainTextLen); /* IN/OUT */
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/*
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* Specialized PKCS1 padding check for signature verify operation.
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* We don't deserialize the decrypted giant; we check for padding
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* in place (in the decrypted giant's n[]), AND we do a byte-for-
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* byte compare of the expected decrypted value against memory
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* passed in to us. This saves two stack-allocated byte arrays,
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* each of MAX_PRIME_SIZE_BYTES - one here, and one in RSA_SigVerify().
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*
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* Returns:
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* -- RSA_Success, padding good and result compares OK
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* -- RSA_VerifyFail, padding good but data miscompare
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* -- RSA_BadSigFormat, bad padding
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* -- RSA_Overflow, expectPlainText too big for this key with PKCS1 padding
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* -- else usual gross errors
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*/
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RSAStatus rsaCheckPkcs1PaddingForSigVfy(
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giant decryptResult,
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const unsigned char *expectPlainText,
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gi_uint16 expectPlainTextLen);
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#ifdef __cplusplus
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}
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#endif
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#endif /* _LIBGRSA_RSA_PADDING_H_ */
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